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But indeed most politicians, even the most ardent reformers and modernizers,
have felt the imperative need to ally themselves with the revival of Buddhism
and to declare their political aims as being consistent with Buddhism.
– Stanley Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 521
We have to understand what being a revolutionary meant at particular times and
in particular places and why there were revolutionaries of that particular sort there
and then.
– John Dunn, Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), p. 12

Buddhism and State Hegemony
Of all traditional Buddhist teachings, perhaps the best known is the emphasis on the socalled Middle Way (Sk. madhyamā-pratipad) or path of moderation between extremes.
Indeed, moderation and its cognates – balance, harmony, equanimity and so on – have
often from a doctrinal perspective and in public perception (especially in the West) been
taken as the fundamental basis of living a life in line with the Buddhadharma. Is it possible
to transfer this avoidance of extreme and radical positions to Buddhism’s link with the political sphere; i.e., its (non-)potential to fuel critique, resistance and opposition? Due to the
tremendous heterogeneity of Buddhism(s) and its varying constellations with politics across
cultures and historical periods, this question may seem far too simplistic. However, what
one can attest is that Buddhism’s spread and propagation as a ‘world religion’ was often
dependent on cooperation with – and patronage by – powerful rulers. Comparable to
other expansive world religions that aligned themselves with politics and developed
Patrice Ladwig thanks the Evans Fellowship for Southeast Asian Studies (University of Cambridge) for supporting
the early research into this topic. Later research was supported by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany. Thanks to all my colleagues in Cambridge, Bristol, Halle and Zürich who over the years kept
inspiring me, and especially my Lao friends who initially pointed to the relevance of this topic.
∗
Corresponding author. Email: patrice@gmx.com
# 2014 Taylor & Francis
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religiously underpinned conceptions of rule, Buddhist institutions and individuals alike have
tended towards political quietism for much of Asian Buddhist history. Max Weber’s characterizations of Buddhism as ‘a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status religion, more
precisely a religious “technology” of wandering and of intellectually-schooled mendicant
monks’ has been heavily criticized, but resonates with the idea of political quietism.1
Although these images of Buddhism have no doubt contributed to the stereotypical
image of the ‘peaceful’ monk (iconically represented today by the ever-smiling 14th Dalai
Lama), a strong case can be made that throughout the history of Buddhism we witness,
by and large, an acceptance – if not promotion –of the status quo of whatever political
regime happens to be in power. Indeed, Suzuki Daisetsu (aka D.T. Suzuki, 1870–1966),
whose work is largely responsible for the transmission of Buddhism to the West in the
postwar period, once remarked that Zen, at least, can find a home in any political
regime, be it democratic, socialist, or fascist.2
From a general, comparative perspective Shmuel Eisenstadt attests that Theravāda
Buddhism, at least, ‘had a much more positive orientation towards the political arena
than Hinduism did. Political activity was not seen just as secondary to ritual and religious
activity; it was defined as a reflection or representation of basic cosmic conceptions’.3
Early Buddhism introduced a new relationship between politics and religion. By embedding its teachings into statecraft, Buddhism was able to give ideological support to concepts of rule and therefore often sustained the hegemony of ruling elites. This positive
orientation to rule and statecraft is grounded in the constitutive narratives of Buddhist
kingship. The ideological blueprint for Buddhist statecraft and its basic cosmic conceptions is the Mauryan king Aśoka (304 – 232 BCE), who ruled over large parts of
India around 250 BCE and is said to have fervently promoted Buddhism. In this
model of statecraft, the ruler was considered a ‘wheel-turning-king’ or ‘universal
monarch’ (Sk. cakravartin; Pa. cakkavatti) or righteous ruler (Sk. dharmarāja; Pa. dhammaraja) standing at the apex of social organization. In early Buddhism (and partially
throughout the history of Theravāda Buddhism), we witness the evolvement of an ideology of Buddhist kingship that intertwines monastic order, polity and the population. The
king as Cakravartin or Dharmarāja sustains his (ideally righteous and dhammic) rule with
the support of the sangha, and this in turn is supposed to constitute proper moral conduct
among subjects. John Strong, departing from his analysis of the Aśokāvadāna (The
Legend of King Aśoka), remarks that ‘throughout Buddhist Asia, the figure of Asoka
has played a major role in concretizing conceptions of kingship and general attitudes
towards rulers and government’.4
We find further textual legitimation of Buddhism’s hegemonic tendencies in two narratives that have served as enduring references to this conception of kingship. Both in the
story of King Mahasammata (described in the Buddhist ‘story of creation’, the Aggañña
Sutta) and that of the Cakravartin (Cakkavatti Sı̄hanāda-Sutta), the world slips from the
condition of social harmony and equal distribution of property into increasing chaos
1

Max Weber, The Religions of India, ed. and trans. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, IL: The Free
Press, 1958), p. 227. For an evaluation and critique of Weber’s view of Buddhism, see David Gellner, The Anthropology of Buddhism and Hinduism: Weberian Themes (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003).
2
Daisetz T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 63.
3
Shmuel Eisenstadt, ‘A Short Comparative Excurse on the (Theravāda) Buddhist Civilizational Format and Historical Experience’ in Shmuel Eisenstadt (ed) Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities (Leiden and
Boston: Brill, 2003), p. 324. For a discussion of the prevailing relationship between Brahmin and king in
ancient India, see Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1980).
4
John Strong, The Legend of King Asoka (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 39.

Downloaded by [James Mark Shields] at 14:57 28 March 2014

Introduction

3

and lawlessness.5 Kingship so to say evolves as a social contract; i.e., the righteous rule of a
king is supposed to ensure stability, prosperity and the spreading of the Buddhist dhamma.
The sociopolitical landscape in which Buddhism evolved was also supportive of political
centralization, alliances with rulers and social stratification. Richard Gombrich notes that
‘Buddhism presents itself as the product of the time of urban development, of urban kingship and the city nobles’ and proposes ‘that the Buddha’s message appealed especially to
town-dwellers and the new social classes’.6
Although early Mahāyāna texts such as the Prajñāparāmitā, Avatamsaka, Sukhāvatı̄ and
_ Buddha in India
Vimalakı̄rti sutras, composed roughly 500 years after the death of
and West Asia, tend to bypass discussion of social and political matters in favor of new
and to varying degrees doctrinally iconoclastic reinterpretations of ‘traditional’ Buddhist
doctrine, as Mahāyāna Buddhism entered East Asia – and China, in particular – it eventually (and fortuitously, at least in terms of guaranteeing survival in a vastly different socioreligious context) fused with hegemonic – broadly ‘Confucian’ – norms regarding social
and political authority.7 Eventually, texts were compiled in Chinese that explicitly
adopted Chinese values of loyalty, harmony and filial piety into a Buddhist framework
(e.g., the seventh-century Sutra on the Profound Kindness of Parents; Ch. Fu mu en zhong
jing).
However, the best example of a ‘politicized’ text within East Asia is the text that has
had more impact on East Asian Buddhists than any other: the Lotus Sutra (Sk. Saddharma-pundarı̄ka sūtra; Ch. Miaofa lianhua jing; Jp. Myōhō renge kyō). At the time of
_ _ of the Mahāyāna, if not even earlier, it was common for Buddhists to
the emergence
appeal to certain texts, artifacts, or rituals for their protective – i.e., thaumaturgical, or
‘magical’ – capacities. Several of the Mahāyāna sutras, but particularly the Lotus Sutra,
due to its grandiose claims to authority, were invoked as talismans for protecting the
realm. The debates and disputes surrounding the acceptance of Buddhism on the part
of the Japanese imperial court in the mid-sixth century CE were based entirely on
whether or not these imported teachings and artifacts could help protect and preserve
the ‘realm’; i.e., the power and status of the still-emerging imperial court. One of the earliest commentaries is attributed to Shōtoku Taishi (573 – 621), the sixth-century regent
and so-called father of Japanese Buddhism. From the early medieval period, monasteries
were constructed throughout the nation with the express purpose of reciting the Lotus
Sutra, which had become established as one of several ‘nation-protecting sutras’ (Jp.
chingo kokka kyō).8
5

Stanley Tambiah, ‘King Mahasammata: The First King in the Buddhist Story of Creation, and his Persisting Relevance’, Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, 20:2 (1989), pp. 227–234.
6
Richard Gombrich, Theravāda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo (London and
New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 50, 55.
7
See the work of Alan Cole for an excellent overview and analysis of the polemical and rhetorical moves made by
the authors of the central Mahāyāna texts, especially Text as Father: Paternal Seductions in Early Mahāyāna Buddhist Literature (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005); and the work of Bernard Faure for
a critical analysis of structures and discourses of power in East Asian Chan/Zen Buddhism; e.g., The Rhetoric of
Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan/Zen Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Chan Insights
and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the Chan Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
8
For more on the political implications and use of the Lotus Sutra, see Jacqueline Stone, ‘When Disobedience is
Filial and Resistance is Loyal: The Lotus Sutra and Social Obligations in Medieval Nichiren Tradition’ in Gene
Reeves (ed) A Buddhist Kaleidoscope: Essays on the Lotus Sutra (Tokyo: Kōsei Publishing, 2002), pp. 261– 281; Jacqueline Stone, ‘Realizing this World as the Buddha Land’ in S.F. Teiser and J.I. Stone (eds) Readings of the Lotus
Sutra (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 209– 236; James Mark Shields, ‘Political Interpretations of
the Lotus Sutra’ in Steven M. Emmanuel (ed) A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy (London: John Wiley & Sons,
2013), pp. 512– 523.
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Although this model of Buddhist support for the state was of course subject to huge variation over time due to Buddhism’s multiple localizations as a world religion, the legacy of
this socio-political alliance of Buddhism with hegemonic rule continues up to the present.
Obviously, most rulers were and are a far cry from the Aśokan ideal. Indeed, this alliance
has on occasion taken on violent and militaristic forms that sustain the rule of regimes that
are in power in Buddhist countries.9 Michael Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer propose
that we find in the history of Buddhism a ‘widespread propensity among states to adopt
Buddhism as official religion and for Buddhism to provide the rationalization for the
state’s sanctioned use of violence’.10 Congruently, over the past several decades Asian Buddhists from Japan to Sri Lanka have been taken to task for complicity with oppressive political regimes.11 Sri Lanka and Thailand, in particular, have been analyzed as cases where a
kind of ‘Buddhist fundamentalism’ has evolved among more orthodox elements of the
monastic order (sangha).12 While much of the critique of ‘Buddhist nationalism’ and ‘fundamentalism’ has emerged from Western scholarship, some of it is ‘homegrown’ – for
example, the Critical Buddhist (hihan bukkyō) movement in Japan.13

Radicalism and Revolution in Buddhist History
However, the wholesale branding of Buddhism as a regime- and hegemony-sustaining religion is obviously too much of a generalization. As with other world religions, Buddhism
also has its ‘radical’ and ‘revolutionary’ side(s). Throughout Buddhist history, heterodox
individuals and movements have fueled opposition and resistance to power holders and
regimes. From a longue dureé perspective on Buddhist history, one can attest that over
the centuries Buddhist ideas, figures, and cults have inspired (mainly peasant) rebellions
and, on occasion, outright resistance to both political and religious authority. Perhaps
the best examples can be drawn from the various forms of chiliastic and millennial uprisings centered on the cult of Maitreya (Ch. Mile; Jp. Miroku), the messianic Buddha of the
future whose return will bring a new, golden age.14 Despite all disparities relating to
9

See Vladimir Tikhonov and Torkel Brekke, Buddhism and Violence: Militarism and Buddhism in Asia (New York:
Routledge, 2013), in which violence and militarism are linked to various forms of (often nationalistic) Buddhism.
10
Michael Jerryson and Mark Juergensmeyer, Buddhist Warfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 9.
Both Buddhism and Violence and Buddhist Warfare are indicators for a more critical understanding of Buddhism,
which Bernard Faure has pleaded for on a more general level; see his Unmasking Buddhism (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
11
See, e.g., Brian Victoria, Zen at War (London: Weatherhill, 1997); Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma:
Just-war Ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (London: Routledge, 2002), Mahinda Deegalle (ed) Buddhism, Conflict and
Violence in Modern Sri Lanka (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
12
Bartholomeusz applies the term ‘fundamentalism’ with caution to some Sri Lankan Buddhists; see Tessa Bartholomeusz and Chandra de Silva (eds) Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka (New York:
SUNY Press, 1998). In Thailand and Burma there are also fundamentalist movements, although these are more
focused on a critique of modernity and capitalist economics; e.g., Santi Asoke Buddhists in Thailand. See
Charles Keyes, ‘Buddhist Economics and Buddhist Fundamentalism in Thailand and Burma’ in Martin Marty
and Scott Appleby (eds) Fundamentalism and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies and Militance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 367–410.
13
For an overview and analysis of Critical Buddhism, see James Mark Shields, Critical Buddhism: Engaging with
Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought (London: Ashgate, 2011). Of course, the global flow of knowledge, reactions
to colonialism and the rationalizing influences of modernity make it hard to clearly distinguish ‘home-grown’ critical Buddhist movements from ‘Western’ ones. For the Theravāda case and its transformation through the colonial
encounter see, for example, Elisabeth Harris, Theravāda Buddhism and the British Encounter: Religious, Missionary
and Colonial Experience in Nineteenth-century Sri Lanka (New York: Routledge, 2006).
14
For an overview of Maitreya and his various interpretations in Buddhist traditions, see Alan Sponberg and Helen
Hardacre (eds) Maitreya: The Future Buddha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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sectarian divisions and localization of Buddhism in various geographical areas in different
historical periods, Thomas DuBois suggests that ‘millenarian thought and devotion to Maitreya have appeared in almost every manifestation of the Buddhist tradition’.15 Therefore,
the narratives, rituals, and ideas and practices surrounding the worship of Maitreya in the
Buddhist world are exemplary for a comparative understanding of the radical and revolutionary potential of Buddhism.16 Buddhism’s conception of time, and its widespread discourse on and prophecies of the decline of the Dharma and the world itself through the
ages can be identified as another cultural matrix that – in specific contexts – can contribute
to the evolvement of radical movements.17
As noted above, in medieval and early modern China various rebellions were fueled by a
belief in the coming of a new era, and there is also ample historic documentation about the
importance of the Maitreya-inspired revolts in the Theravāda tradition, notably in Burma,
Thailand, Cambodia and Laos.18 Japan, as well, had its share of Buddhist-inspired unrest,
including the ikkō-ikki uprisings of the Muromachi period, during which peasant farmers,
monks and some nobles banded together to fight against samurai rule, under the inspiration of Amida Buddha and the teachings of the Shin sect. Many of these millennial rebellions were guided by charismatic leaders and by utopian ideas of equality, the coming of
prosperity, just distribution of property and moral perfection. Thomas DuBois even
suggests that Buddhist millenarianism ‘is a branch of utopianism’.19 In his sociology of
knowledge reading of utopianism (also extendable to millenarianism), Karl Mannheim
proposes a distinction between ideology and utopia, in which ideology is perpetuated by
dominant groups while utopia is largely linked to the oppressed and their efforts to
counter the dominant ideology.20
Besides the millennial potentials of Buddhism, there is a second political-religious constellation that at times was essential for the development of Buddhism’s radical, ‘oppositional’ side, namely the tension inherent in the model of Buddhist kingship mentioned
15

Thomas DuBois, ‘Maitreya’ in Robert Buswell (ed) Macmillan Encyclopedia of Buddhism (New York: Macmillan,
2004), p. 538.
16
See Patrice Ladwig’s essay in this collection for general reflections on the revolutionary potentials of Buddhism in
the context of millennial movements.
17
For an analysis of the frameworks of Buddhist historical thought in relation to the discourse of decline in early
Indian, East Asian and Tibetan Buddhism, see Jan Nattier, Once Upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy
of Decline (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1991).
18
See, e.g., Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1976); Susan Naquin, Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lung Uprising of 1774 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1981). For Theravāda Buddhism in Southeast Asia, see, e.g., Charles F. Keyes, ‘Millenialism,
Theravāda Buddhism and Thai society’, Journal of Asian Studies, 36: 2 (February 1977), pp. 283 –302. John
Marston provides an interesting picture of movements with millennial characteristics in Cambodia: ‘Clay into
Stone: A Modern-Day Tāpas’ in John Marston and Elizabeth Guthrie (eds) History, Buddhism, and New Religious
Movements in Cambodia (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004). Also see Ashley Thompson, ‘The Future of
Cambodia’s Past: A Messianic Middle-Cambodian Royal Cult’ in the same volume. Ian Baird has recently reanalyzed the millennial revolts in southern Laos and provides a good overview of the field: ‘Millenarian Movements in
Southern Laos and Northeastern Siam (Thailand) at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: Reconsidering the Involvement of the Champassak Royal House’, South East Asia Research, 21:2 (2013), pp. 257– 279. In the context of
contemporary Laos, Patrice Ladwig looks at the repression, absence and desire for Buddhist (millennial) charisma:
‘Haunting the State: Rumors, Spectral Apparitions and the Longing for Buddhist Charisma in Laos’, Asian Studies
Review, 37:4 (2013), pp. 509–526. For Burma and the famous Saya-San rebellion, see Maitrii Aung-Thwin, The
Return of the Galon King: History, Law, and Rebellion in Colonial Burma (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010).
19
Thomas DuBois, ‘Millenarianism and Millenarian Movements’, in Buswell, op. cit., p. 539.
20
Mannheim defines utopia as a state of mind and elaborates: ‘A state of mind is utopian when (a) it is incongruous
with the immediate situation and (b) when passed onto actions, tend to shatter the order of things’. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1966), p. 341. Shattering the order of things can lend itself to radicalism and revolt.
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above. In early Buddhism and Theravāda Buddhism we find not only cooperation between
monarch and sangha (the ‘two wheels of the dhamma’), but also tension. The sangha was
dependent on the patronage of Buddhist kings, but monks’ asceticism and moral purity –
from which kings draw their power – can also be a means of critique. Steven Collins states
that in relation to Pali Buddhism: ‘it is easy to find texts from all periods which take a critical view of kingship. Kings are paired with thieves, along with natural forces such as fire and
water, as phenomena which can bring danger and ruin’.21 However, as in the case of millennialism, what at first sight might seem radical may also be driven by a more conservative
or ‘restorative’ ideology that aims at a return to an older (often idealized) social and religious order, as depicted in the Aggañña Sutta and Cakkavatti Sı̄hanāda-Sutta. Many of
the modern revolts in Southeast Asia were aiming at the reconstitution of traditional patterns of Buddhist rule disrupted by colonialism and/or rapid modernization. Causes for
radicalism and rebellion vary considerably, as do their theoretical interpretations. Explanations range from theories of relative deprivation and growing economic inequalities to
theories that embed the development of radicalism and revolt in a broader cultural perspective that extends beyond the economic and political realms.22
However, premodern forms of radicalism – whether inspired by latent Buddhist millennialism or emerging from its imbedded critique of Buddhist kingship – rarely had a lasting
impact. Despite the fact that many of these rebellious movements indeed destabilized and
changed the political order through active resistance and utopian aspirations, they rarely survived the death of their charismatic leaders. In the long run they were not able to question the
political order in itself. Indeed, many if most of the Buddhist protest movements in the premodern period led by prophetic and charismatic leaders can be classified as mere outbursts of
radicalism and revolt. This is grounded in the nature of charisma. As Max Weber suggested in
his classical analysis of charisma as a form of power, charisma is inherently unstable, ephemeral and bound to a specific person. At some point millennial and restorative movements lose
their dynamics and undergo a certain rationalization and routinization (G. Veralltäglichung),
especially with the death or change of leaders. They fall back into more bureaucratic and institutionalized, and less radical forms of religious and social organization.23 These forms of
radicalism, rebellion and utopian aspirations can be understood as the emergence of potentialities, as a horizon where new possibilities become temporarily visible.
Charles Keyes therefore proposes that ‘millennialism as a religion is invariably a transitory phenomenon’, and that for the case of Southeast Asian Theravāda Buddhism ‘despite
the fundamental tension between monarchs and monks in the premodern period, the
Asokan model for Buddhist polities was not fundamentally challenged until the expansion
of colonial power from the late eighteenth century on’.24
21

Steven Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 423.
22
For example, in Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), Ted Gurr links rebellion and
revolution to the experience of frustrated expectations. Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (New York:
Grove Press, 1965) interprets political violence in revolutionary and radical movements from a psychological perspective, as a way of healing the wounds of colonialism.
23
See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, trans. Guenther Ross and Claus
Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 296– 297. For more nuanced and ethnographically
grounded approaches, see Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming, Grassroots Charisma: Four Local Leaders
in China (London: Psychology Press, 2001); Stanley Tambiah, The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of
Amulets: A Study in Charisma, Hagiography, Sectarianism, and Millennial Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 319 ff.
24
Charles F. Keyes, ‘Millennialism’, p. 302; Charles F. Keyes, ‘Buddhism Confronts the State’ in John WhalenBridge and Pattana Kitiarsa (eds) Buddhism, Modernity and the State in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013), p. 21.
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Modern Buddhist Radicalism and Buddhist Socialism
Beginning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we witness the emergence of
more concerted and ideologically grounded forms of political radicalism in Asia. Trying to
achieve social change beyond temporary rebellion and resistance, Marxist-inspired movements so-to-say set out to ‘professionalize’ the rebellious potentials of peasants and develop
theories about revolutions and long-lasting social change.25 Whereas millennial rebellions
were understood as mere temporary outbursts, Marxist theory defined revolution as a
rapid, but long-lasting fundamental transformation of the state and social structure with
the aim of instituting these new power relations on a continuous basis.26
Given how deeply embedded are Buddhist traditions in various cultures and nations
throughout Asia, it comes as no surprise that Buddhists, too, were directly affected by
Marxist and related ideas. And yet, taking into account that the public interaction
between communism and religion has usually been perceived (with justification) as
being marked by mutual antagonism, the other side of this interaction – namely the voluntary, intentional and at times synergetic interaction of Buddhism and various forms of
Marxism – has often been overlooked.27 The meeting of political, oppositional activism
and Buddhism was in many cases rooted in the colonial context and other political situations marked by strong power imbalances, economic inequality and hegemony. Buddhist
Asia’s confrontation with colonialism often involved an attack on, and a restructuring of
the traditional alliance between, secular rulers and Buddhism. These developments
forced religious leaders and institutions to react to modernizing pressure, to discourses
of Western ‘rational’ superiority or sheer oppression through forces of external or internal
colonialism.28 Resistance to colonialism in some cases brought out the radical side of Buddhism, partially inspired by independence movements leaning towards communism and
socialism.

25

There is obviously a large spectrum of approaches to revolution. For an overview of revolution and its differences
from rebellion or mere resistance see, for example, John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis
of a Political Phenomenon, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); James DeFronzo, Revolutions
and Revolutionary Movements, 4th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Bülent Diken’s Revolt, Revolution,
Critique: The Paradox of Society (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011) advances a philosophically inspired view.
26
See the analysis of rebels and social bandits in Eric Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social
Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1959).
27
There is rich documentation about the oppression of Buddhism through various communist movements. See,
for example, Ian Harris, Buddhism in a Dark Age: Cambodian Monks Under Pol Pot (Honolulu: University of
Hawai‘i Press, 2012); Holmes Welch, Buddhism under Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
At the theoretical level, Claude Lévi-Strauss, in his semi-autobiographical Tristes Tropiques (1955), argues that
both Buddhism and Marxism aim for ‘liberation’ and, as a result, have no obvious conflict. Far from being a teaching of resignation, he insists: ‘This great religion of not-knowingness . . . bears witness, rather, to our natural gifts,
raising us to the point at which we discover truth in the guise of the mutual exclusiveness of being and knowing.
And, by a further audacity, it has achieved something that, elsewhere, only Marxism has brought off: it has reconciled the problem of metaphysics with the problem of human behaviour.’ In short, Lévi-Strauss sees within Buddhism a potential ‘missing link’ in the chain between the quest for individual contentment and the drive for social
justice. Claude Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, trans. John Russell (New York: Criterion Books, 1961), pp. 395–
396. These somewhat offhand comments struck a chord with Jacques Derrida, who comments on them, critically,
in Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), pp. 120, 138. Bill Martin takes up this exchange in
Ethical Marxism (Chicago: Open Court, 2008).
28
For recent studies of Buddhism under colonialism see, e.g., Ann Blackburn, Locations of Buddhism: Colonialism
and Modernity in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Anne Ruth Hansen, How to Behave: Buddhism and Modernity in Colonial Cambodia, 1860–1930 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007). Donald
S. Lopez, Jr. has described the impact of the colonial situation on the study of Buddhism itself in Curators of
the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
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Even today – in an age where most people consider socialism and related ideologies anachronistic relics of the past – we witness invocations of Marxism among leading Buddhists.
In 2008 the 14th Dalai Lama, speaking at the Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad, explained: ‘I am a Marxist monk, a Buddhist Marxist. I belong to the Marxist camp,
because unlike capitalism, Marxism is more ethical’.29 Although the face value of such offthe-cuff statements should be questioned, it is interesting to note that in the twentieth
century, particularly between the 1950s and 1970s, one finds efforts to merge Buddhism
with socialist ideas and practices in practically every country with a significant proportion
of Buddhists. In Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Sri Lanka, various forms of Buddhist socialism were promoted, especially in the postcolonial phase. In Japan, China, Taiwan, Korea,
Tibet, India and other places, monks and intellectuals looked for potential connection
points between Buddhism, Marxism, anarchism, and so on in order to promote anticolonial or social reform movements.30 Almost 50 years before the Dalai Lama confessed
that he belongs to the ‘Marxist camp’, Burma’s Prime Minister U Nu (1907 – 1995)
launched a public campaign to transform Burmese society through the introduction of
what he labeled ‘Buddhist Socialism’. Of course, Buddhism is not an exceptional case, as
other forms of modern experiments in religious socialism clearly show.31
Buddhism and socialist movements encountered one another – one could say – in a
short window of historical opportunity. This may be grounded in the fact that many
members of the elite that were to rule after the end of colonialism came in direct
contact with progressive ideas their educational years. A good example is Burma, where
people like soon-to-be prime minister U Nu and the intellectual Thein Maung became
acquainted with socialism and communism while studying in Rangoon and in the
United Kingdom. U Nu translated parts of Marx’s Das Kapital into Burmese and Thein
Maung became a member of Clemens Dutt’s ‘Communist League against Imperialism’
in London. Similarly, many Sri Lankan students who went to study in the United
Kingdom were heavily influenced by Harold Laski’s lectures on Marx and later became
influential figures in post-independence Sri Lanka.32 However, this does not mean that
29

‘More Politics: The Dalai Lama as Marxist Monk’, Tricycle, 24 January 2008, http://www.tricycle.com/p/s65. This
is only one of a few statements in which the Dalai Lama reveals his sympathies for Marxist theory.
30
Some studies that analyze the connection of Marxism (and related radical ideologies) and Buddhism will be discussed later in this essay. See in this volume the contributions of Chanju Mun on Korea, Hans-Bernd Zöllner on
Buddhadasa’s Buddhist Socialism in Thailand, Justin Ritzinger on the reformist monk Taixu in China, and James
Shields on the roots of radicalism among progressive monks in early twentieth-century Japan. For Southeast Asian
Theravāda Buddhism, also see Walter Skrobanek, Buddhistische Politik in Thailand mit besonderer Berücksichtigung
des heterodoxen Messianismus (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1976) and Norodom Sihanouk, Notre socialisme buddhique (Phnom Penh: Le Ministère de l’Information, 1965). For East Asian Buddhism see, e.g., Vladimir Thikhonov,
‘Han Yongun’s Buddhist Socialism in the 1920s’, International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture, 6 (2006),
pp. 207 –228; Xue Yu, ‘Buddhist Contribution to the Socialist Transformation of Buddhism in China: Activities of
Ven. Juzan during 1949–1953′ , Journal of Global Buddhism, 10 (2010), pp. 217– 254; Don Alvin (2001), Toward a
Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s Reforms (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001). Other studies not discussed here will soon be published in a volume edited by Patrice Ladwig entitled Buddhist Socialisms in Asia: An
Historical Perspective (London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming).
31
The best example of this is the emergence of Christian (largely Roman Catholic) Liberation Theology in Latin
America during the 1950s and 1960s. See Christian Smith, The Emergence of Liberation Theology: Radical Religion
and the Social Movement Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Jim Bissett focuses on the evolvement
of these ideas in smaller communities, in Agrarian Socialism in America: Marx, Jefferson, and Jesus in the Oklahoma
Countryside, 1904–1920 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999). For Islam see the now somewhat
dated, but still substantial, work of Maxime Rodinson, Marxisme et monde musulman (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1972).
32
See Trevor Ling’s analysis of the meeting of Marxism and Buddhism in various Asian countries and with reference to the Burmese and Sri Lankan case: Buddha, Marx and God: Some Aspects of Religion in the Modern World,
2nd ed. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1979), pp. 89 ff.
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most of them completely abandoned their traditional education and Buddhist beliefs, but
tried rather to merge them with what they had learnt (directly or indirectly) from and in the
countries of the colonizers. As Tambiah rightly notes in the quote at the beginning of this
essay, even the most ardent reformers felt the need to embed their modernizing agendas
into Buddhist thought. Various forms of leftist thought here became part of a transnational
knowledge exchange and movements against colonialism localized through a Buddhist lens,
feeding hopes of a better future and independence from colonialism.
In some cases, the convergence of Buddhist protest movements, nationalism and
anti-colonialism was more or less coincidental, anchored in the shared history of (neo)colonialism. Just to give one example: the Buddhist protest movement against the
Southern Vietnamese Diem Regime (with numerous self-immolations of monks) was
most likely not connected to the Northern Vietnamese communist movement that tried
to foster stronger resistance to ‘American colonialism’. And yet, the picture of Thich
Quang Duc’s public self-immolation on a road in Saigon on 11 June 1963 became part
of a global stream of images and served as excellent propaganda for the Indochinese Communist movement.33
Besides the incidental meetings of Buddhism and Marxism, one must also take into
account that many of these evolving radical political movements instrumentalized Buddhism in order to win public support. The display of a propagandistic, Buddhist-inspired
rhetoric initially enabled them to reach the masses with a familiar vocabulary, but later –
after the seizure of power – they frequently discriminated against Buddhism as an ‘opium
of the people’. Hannah Arendt’s dictum that the ‘most radical revolutionary will become a
conservative on the day after the revolution’ resulted in some extreme cases in devastation
of monasteries and mass killings. Despite the fact that in the early phase of communism
some, for example, some Buryat and Mongolian Buddhist Lamas, actually supported the
communist movement,34 mass killings took place under Stalin a few years later.35 Although
the story of the Buddhism’s role in the Cold War largely remains to be written, one can
attest that after World War II, Buddhism was often used as a political resource.36 In particular, the ‘the propagandistic value of the Buddhist communities in the USSR’ was recognized for external relations with, for example, Southeast Asia.37 Despite the fact that the
success and failure of these radical and revolutionary movements varied considerably,
and that elaborate theoretical and practical efforts remained more the exception than the
rule, the impact of communist movements on Buddhism in terms of radicalization and
polarization (beyond propaganda and discrimination) cannot be ignored. These cases
provide a multitude of interesting questions that can shed light on Buddhism’s radical
and revolutionary potential.
33

Recently, self-immolation as a radical Buddhist practice has regained attention in the context of Tibetan resistance against Chinese political repression. On Vietnamese self-immolations and their political significance, see
Ellen Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Recent self-immolations in Tibet are excellently analyzed by Carole McGranahan and Ralph Litzinger (eds),
Self-Immolation as Protest in Tibet, Special Issue of Cultural Anthropology,. http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/
93-self-immolation-as-protest-in-tibet, 2012, accessed 12 January 2014.
34
Emanuel Sarkisyanz, ‘Communism and Lamaist Utopianism in Central Asia’, The Review of Politics, 20:4 (1958),
pp. 623– 633.
35
With over 100,000 monks in the 1920s, the Mongolian Buddhist sangha had virtually disappeared by 1940. See
Michael Jerryson, Mongolian Buddhism: The Rise and Fall of the Sangha (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2007),
p. 90.
36
One notable exception to the lack of scholarship on the topic is the unpublished doctoral thesis of Eugene Ford,
Cold War Monks: An International History of Buddhism, Politics and Regionalism in Thailand and Southeast Asia,
1941– 1976 (Yale University, 2012).
37
Ling, op. cit., p. 107.
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How can we conceptualize this meeting of radical, leftist politics and Buddhism? The
postcolonial moment in Southeast Asia and other Buddhist regions of Asia fostered
hopes and aspirations for a merging of ‘tradition’ with ‘modernity’, often aiming at indigenizing modernity beyond the mere imitation of colonial powers. Although these movements were often using a rhetoric and vocabulary derived from ‘Western’ ideologies such as
nationalism(s) and communism, a model of cultural transmission that assumes that the
‘West’ as the origin of these ideas and depicts Asian Buddhists as passive recipients is no
longer adequate to understand these processes – indeed, in some ways this ironically perpetuates the very orientalist assumptions this model is ostensibly trying to combat. In this
volume of essays our contributors reflect on the creative appropriations, deflections, localizations and reinterpretations of various progressive and radical ideologies. Instead of
searching for the origins of these ideas in the West, the emphasis has to be on the ‘autonomous histories’ within which these movements were embedded.38 This takes us beyond
simplistic dichotomies of East and West, tradition and modernity, and towards an emphasis on historiography, localization and the application of emic viewpoints to the multiplicity
of visions of modernity, or what Shmuel Eisenstadt has called ‘multiple modernities’.39 This
is also taken into account by David McLellan, who starts his overview of the history of Asian
communism with the very general premise that ‘Marxism had to come to terms with indigenous cultural values’, but then goes on to cite the Burmese socialist U Ba She, who in
1951 stated that Marxism and Buddhism are not merely similar, but ‘in fact they are the
same in concept’.40
The seeming dependency of these Buddhist movement on Western ideologies might be
one of the reasons why this undercurrent of Buddhism’s engagement with ‘progressive’ and
radical politics has until lately largely been ignored in both Western and Asian mainstream
scholarship. While the subfield of Buddhism and politics has over the years produced a
body of important works, the focus has often been on the general configuration of Buddhism and politics, rather than on the potentially radical aspects of this relationship.41
Moreover, although several works in the past few decades have dealt with the politics of
Asian Buddhism, many of these have focused on specific cases of Buddhist individuals
and institutions that have supported conservative political regimes.42 While various publications on contemporary Engaged Buddhism serve to highlight the issue of ‘progressive’,
socially engaged Buddhism, they rarely stray beyond the mainstream, liberal forms to
38

The concept of autonomous history was first developed in John Smail’s article, ‘On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia’, Journal of Southeast Asian History, 2:2 (1961), pp. 72– 102. This
approach takes seriously non-Eurocentric historiography (and not only history), indigenous concepts and internal
dynamics. See Maitri Aung-Thwin, ‘Structuring Revolt: Communities of Interpretation in the Historiography of
the Saya San Rebellion’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 39:2 (2008), pp. 297–317 for an excellent review of
these historical approaches and their relevance for understanding millennial movements in Southeast Asia.
39
The concept of multiple modernities rejects the assumption that global modernity is derived from the West as a
single source and that it follows a universal pattern. The concept is therefore also a critique of the classical,
Western-focused theory of modernization and should also be transferred to the global circulation of ideas associated with various forms of Marxist-inspired thought. See Shmuel Eisenstadt, Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities, 2 vols. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).
40
David McLellan, ‘Asian Communism’ in Terence Ball and Richard Bellamy (eds) The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 267.
41
For a good general overview, see Ian Harris’s excellent volume Buddhism, Power and Political Order (Abingdon
and New York: Routledge, 2007). Especially in relation to Theravāda Buddhism there have been a few landmark
studies on the general relation of Buddhism and politics, such as Bardwell Smith (ed), Religion and Legitimation of
Power in Thailand, Laos and Burma (Chambersburg, PA: Anima Publications, 1978) and Gananath Obeyesekere,
Frank Reynolds and Bardwell Smith, The Two Wheels of the Dhamma: Essays on the Theravāda Tradition in India
and Ceylon (Chambersburg, PA: American Academy of Religion, 1972).
42
See for example Jerryson and Juergensmeyer, op. cit.
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which these movements tend.43 The notion of ‘Buddhist modernism’ is certainly useful in
many contexts and has been used rather cautiously and reflexively by some of its propagators, but we feel that the radical movements discussed so far and the case studies contained
in this volume deserve a somewhat broader space.44
In terms of works that deal specifically with forms of Buddhist socialism and radical
Buddhist praxis, there are a few older studies that went beyond the academic mainstream
of their time and were already trying to grasp the impact of radical political ideologies such
as socialism on Buddhism. Ernst Benz’s Buddhism or Communism: Which holds the Future
of Asia? (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1965) is somewhat superficial, but gives a good
overview of the impact of Marxism and Maoism on Buddhism, as does Trevor Ling’s
Buddha, Marx, and God, noted above. The most significant work is Emanuel Sarkisyanz’s
Buddhist Backgrounds of the Burmese Revolution (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).
Sarkisyanz’s work is of particular importance here. Written during a time when Buddhism
was often conceived as a religion incompatible with socialism and even with modernity, the
work used the specific case of Burma under U Nu to show how radical political ideologies
such as socialism could be connected to Buddhist teachings and concepts of rule in a postcolonial Cold War context. Rebellion, resistance and aspiration for radical social reform
were not only pragmatic copies of ‘Western’ ideas with some Buddhist surface paint, but
according to Sarkisyanz were built on emic concepts: ‘Thus U Nu’s Buddhist socialism
appears against the background of Burma’s intellectual history not as purely pragmatic
adaptation to postwar political requirements but as a modernized expression of ideas
deep rooted in Burma’s Buddhist heritage of the Asokan tradition’.45
Moreover, Sarkisyanz’s research also extended this theme to Central Asia. Due to his
proficiency in Russian, he was able to reconstruct the reception and transformation of communist ideas among the Buryats during the early phase of communism (i.e., the 1920s).
Here, he found a strong association of the belief in the return of King Gesar and the
coming of a Buddhist utopia, which by some Buryat Lamas was equated with the emergence
of a classless communist society.46 At that time, most Western commentators probably
classified these indigenous understandings of socialism and communism as superstition
or as a product of insufficient education. In both of Sarkisyanz’s studies, the dichotomy
between ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ – or more specifically, between premodern forms of
political engagement and modern political ideologies such as Marxism – is far more flexible and permeable than often imagined. Only by taking these emic views and Buddhist
appropriations of leftist ideologies seriously can we hope to understand what radical and
revolutionary Buddhism meant at specific times in particular places. While on one level
the message of the quote by John Dunn cited at the beginning of this essay (‘to understand

43

See the work of Christopher Queen and Sallie King (eds), Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements
(New York: SUNY Press, 1996).
44
See David L. McMahan, The Making of Buddhist Modernism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
McMahan points to important topics such as demythologization, scientific rationalization, and so on, that are
also of relevance for the movements we discuss here. Buddhism’s encounter with radical movements also provoked
questioning into many of its basic assumptions; see, for example, MacMahan’s reference to the Taiwanese monk
Taixu (pp. 75 ff.). However, the radical political aspects of Buddhism are somewhat peripheral to this otherwise
important book.
45
Manuel [sic] Sarkisyanz, ‘On the Place of U Nu’s Buddhist Socialism in Burma’s History of Ideas’, Studies on
Asia, Series I, 2 (1961), p. 59.
46
Emanuel Sarkisyanz, ‘Communism and Lamaist Utopianism in Central Asia’, The Review of Politics, 20:4 (1958),
pp. 623– 633. See also his earlier work, where central Asian Buddhist messianic thought is shown to have the
capacity to resonate with tsarist and communist influence. Emanuel Sarkisyanz, Russland und der Messianismus
des Orients: Sendungsbewusstsein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1955).
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what being a revolutionary meant . . . ’) is obvious, here it takes on a somewhat deeper
meaning.

Downloaded by [James Mark Shields] at 14:57 28 March 2014

Radical Reinterpretations
Alexandra David-Néel (1868 – 1969), the French explorer of Tibet who managed to enter
Lhasa in 1924, was also an eyewitness of the political transformations that were happening
in Asia. Similar to Sarkisyanz’s analysis of the relation of Buddhist utopia and the coming
of communism in Central Asia, David-Néel observed a certain congruence between ideas of
Buddhist utopia exemplified in the promised return of King Gesar and communist ideas of
the revolution. In 1953 she asked: ‘Would the idea of taking advantage of those remarkable
messianic dreams that haunt Tibetan minds not occur to the leaders of Red China, now that
they have installed themselves among them? Perhaps it has already occurred to them’.47
Richard Shek, writing on millennialism in East Asia, seems to confirm David-Néel’s suspicion almost 50 years later: ‘In a certain sense, twentieth century Chinese revolutionaries,
including the Communists, operated much in the same mode as earlier millenarian sectarians in their attempt to change the world’.48
How can we grasp such congruencies? How do ideas that were formed hundreds of years
ago in texts, oral history and ritual practice get transformed in the stream of history in order
to serve radical and revolutionary ideas and practices in modern Buddhism? We have
already referred to the concept of ‘autonomous histories’ and the significance of emic perspectives. In short, one must take into account how Buddhists themselves have tried to
reconstruct specific aspects of Buddhism (mainly from textual sources) in order to legitimize their radical and revolutionary aspirations. The efforts to connect these ‘modern’
Buddhist movements to ‘traditional’ Buddhist teachings, or even to the words and
actions of the Buddha himself, is a crucial interpretative process that in the context of
this volume is treated less as an issue of historical accuracy than as a way of establishing
new frameworks of interpretation and hermeneutics.49 That these novel readings are
based on selective and often historically disputable arguments from the perspective of
the ‘scientific study’ of religion might make it easy to dismiss such efforts as ‘invented traditions’, the product of overheated imaginations or even willful distortions.50 More importantly, however, they enabled Buddhists to comment upon social developments, aspire for
social change and promote forms of radical Buddhism in order to thereby actualize Buddhism as a living and politically relevant tradition.
How, then, was the convergence of Buddhist teachings, radicalism, revolutionary aspirations and Marxist ideology achieved? Can we identify recurrent themes or features that
emerged in these discussions at different times and in different places? We can only
allude here to a few points. A comprehensive history of ‘radical Buddhism’ might conceivably begin with the early sangha – whose ideas, values and activities were formed in a
47

Alexandra David-Néel, Le vieux Tibet face à la Chine nouvelle (Paris: Plon, 1953), p. 24.
Richard Shek, ‘Millenarianism: Chinese Millennial Movements’ in Lindsay Jones (ed) Encyclopedia of Religion,
2nd ed., vol. 8 (New York: Macmillan, p. 6041).
49
For more on Buddhist hermeneutics and textual exegesis see Robert Thurman, ‘Buddhist Hermeneutics’, Journal
of the American Academy of Religion, 46:1 (1978), pp. 19– 39, and Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Buddhist Hermeneutics
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1992). Paul J. Griffiths, Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), places hermeneutics in a larger discussion about Christianity and Buddhism.
50
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1983). Although a useful notion, it can also be seductive to interpret the process of cultural innovation and adaptation as mere ‘invention’.
48

Downloaded by [James Mark Shields] at 14:57 28 March 2014

Introduction 13
period of intense social transformation in the light of the social and religious orthodoxies of
classical India. Some of these movements presented the Buddha himself as a kind of revolutionary, opposing the caste system and promoting social justice. Other readings use Buddhist visions of utopia and the cult of Maitreya in order to equate this with the coming of a
communist utopia and a Buddhist welfare state. Then we have movements that present the
sangha as an Ur-communist community with democratic assemblies based on the equal
distribution of property.51
Let us refer to some examples of these creative actualizations of Buddhist traditions in the
context of radical and revolutionary ideas in modern Buddhism. The work of the D.C.
Vijayavardhana gives us a good example how Buddhism was connected to left-wing ideologies. His 700-page work The Revolt in the Temple, published to coincide with celebrations
of 2500 years of Buddhism in 1956, aims at integrating communism, Buddhism and Sri
Lankan nationalism. Vijayavardhana first invokes Hegelian dialectics and states that: ‘the
thesis of traditional Buddhism and the anti-thesis of Marxian communism is incomplete.
[ . . . ] We have reached a stage where synthesis is necessary’.52 Many of his arguments for
this synthesis refer to early Buddhism, its forms of monastic organization and its property
rights as an example of a communist community:
The early sangha, as established by the Buddha, comprised real Communists
whose precept and practice have virtually disappeared from the earth. They
were a classless community every member of which was equal (sama samaja).
They individually owned no property, all possessions being held by the community. [ . . . ] Here, as far as it was humanly possible, was realized the true Communist ideal of a classless equalitarian and non-attached society.53
Another popular argument used by Buddhists to point to the convergence of Buddhism,
socialism and radical social reform is the alleged opposition of the Buddha to the caste
system. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar’s (1891– 1956) socialist-inspired interpretation of Buddhism in 1950s India, and its attraction for converts who wanted to escape the caste system,
is largely based on this proposition.54 The Buddha is here frequently depicted as a radical
revolutionary, opposed the Brahmanic mainstream.55 This has also evolved in many other
contexts: during a conversation Patrice Ladwig held with an aging Lao ‘revolutionary’ Buddhist monk in 2008, the same point was brought up. During the ‘liberation struggle against
American oppression’ in the 1960s and 1970s, the monks aligned with the Lao communist
51

For a critical textual analysis of assemblies in the Pali canon, and the question of whether the early monastic
community can be understood as an ideal society, see Collins, op. cit., pp. 436 ff. In relation to property rights,
there are many cases in which the monastic order was also in the possession of large lands acquired through
donations; see, e.g., Gombrich, op. cit., pp. 161 ff. Michael Aung-Thwin, ‘The Role of Sasana Reform in
Burmese History: Economic Dimensions of Religious Purification’, Journal of Asian Studies, 38:4 (1979), even
speaks of monastic landlordism (pp. 671– 688). The work of Gregory Schopen on early Indian Buddhism has
shown that Buddhism and business were much more closely associated than Western orientalists and native revitalizers have tended to believe; see, e.g., his Buddhist Monks and Business Matters (Honolulu: University of
Hawai‘i Press, 2004).
52
D. C. Vijayavardhana, The Revolt in the Temple (Colombo: Sinha Publications, 1956), p. 603.
53
Ibid., pp. 596–597.
54
On Ambedkar’s understanding of Buddhism and his efforts to merge it with radical anti-caste politics and socialism see, e.g., Surendra Jondhale and Johannes Beltz (eds), Reconstructing the World: B.R. Ambedkar and Buddhism
in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004).
55
See Aakash S. Rathore, ‘What can Buddha Teach a Marxist?’ in Bhalchandra Mugekar and Aakash S. Rathore
(eds)Buddhism and the Contemporary World: An Ambedkarian Perspective (New Delhi: Bookwell, 2007). pp.
97– 106.
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forces argued that the Buddha’s rejection of the caste system should be understood as an
attack on feudal society and the oppressive class system. The monk also referred to the
Buddha’s biography: a story of a rich man who renounces wealth and power and confronts
himself with the suffering of the world. Suffering (dukkha) was here interpreted in Marxian
terms as the suffering of the oppressed, lower-caste people; or when transposed to modern
times, the working class or peasants.56 This argument has either traveled very far, or
perhaps it is simply very suggestive and aligns well with modern interpretations of the
radical and revolutionary potentials of Buddhism. No doubt the anti-brahmanical tone
one often finds in early Buddhist texts inspired this interpretation. Richard Gombrich partially sustains this argument historically and states ‘that by the time of the Buddha, there
was already a whole milieu of renouncers, a kind of counter-culture with which Brahmanical ideology was struggling to come to terms’.57 However, although Buddhism did have
opposing views to Brahmanism, the statement that early Buddhism actively rejected the
caste system and promoted an egalitarian society has been heavily criticized.58
In other interpretations we find even stronger arguments that depict the Buddha as a political radical, or even an earlier incarnation of Marx, Lenin and other leftist ideologists. Sarkisyanz, for example, states ‘that Buddha was a predecessor of Lenin was a frequent claim of
Soviet Buryat modernist Lamaism and even of some Buryat Communists in the 1920s’.59
Here, Marxism is embedded into the cosmology of reincarnation and into a historical continuum that is marked by numerous appearances of different bodhisattvas through the ages.
Moving to Japan, whose largely ‘self-imposed’ process of rapid modernization after the
Meiji Restoration of 1868 resulted in some of the first serious attempts to conjoin Buddhism with progressive and radical political praxis.60 The most significant early examples
of ‘radical Buddhism’ in Japan were Shin sect priest Takagi Kenmyō (1864 – 1914) and
Sōtō Zen priest Uchiyama Gudō (1874 – 1911), both of whom were arrested in 1910 on
trumped-up charges of plotting to assassinate the Emperor in what is known as the
High Treason Incident (Gudō was among the dozen leftists executed in 1911).61 Beyond
its tragic conclusion, Gudō’s case is instructive for his preference for an ‘anarchistic’
interpretation of (Zen) Buddhism, which highlights the power and responsibilities of the
individual (via ‘direct action’) to transform structures that perpetuate suffering. By the
1920s, anarchism had given way to Marxism as the dominant trend within the Japanese
left, and Buddhist socialism found a new locus in the life and work of figures such as
Seno’o Girō (1889 – 1961), the Nichiren Buddhist layman whose Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism joined forces with secular socialist and labor parties to form a ‘common
front’ dedicated to the destruction of the capitalist system. Made up of young scholars and
social activists who were critical of capitalism, internationalist in outlook, and committed
to a pan-sectarian and humanist form of Buddhism that would work for social justice and
56

For more details on this exegesis of Buddhism through Lao revolutionary monks see Patrice Ladwig, ‘Prediger
der Revolution: Der buddhistische Klerus und seine Verbindungen zur Kommunistischen Bewegung in Laos
(1957–1975)’, Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung, 15 (2009), pp. 181– 197.
57
Gombrich, op. cit., p. 57.
58
See, e.g., Yuvraj Krishan, ‘Buddhism and the Caste System’, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies, 9:1 (1986), pp. 71–84. Despite academic criticism, the point that Buddhism was opposed to the caste
system has become a standard argument used by (even non-radical) modern Buddhists to point to their religion’s
‘progressive’ character.
59
Sarkisyanz, ‘Communism and Lamaist Utopianism’, op. cit., p. 632.
60
For more on Buddhist socialism in the Japanese context, particularly the period 1868–1945, see James Mark
Shields, ‘Carrying Buddha into the Streets: Buddhist Socialist Thought in Modern Japan’, in Gereon Kopf (ed)
Dao Companion to Japanese Buddhist Philosophy (New York: Springer, forthcoming).
61
See Shields’s contribution to this volume: ‘Zen and the Art of Treason: Radical Buddhist Priests of Late Meiji
Japan’.
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world peace, the League’s quasi-Christian motto was ‘carry the Buddha on your backs and
go out into the streets and villages’. Established in Tokyo in April 1931, Seno’o’s Youth
League would survive for five years before being crushed in the widespread crackdown
against leftist activists in 1936.62
However, Buddhists proposing such views were also aware of the fact that not all aspects
of radical ideologies were compatible with their reinterpretation of Buddhism. There is
already significant diversity in the thought and practice of, for example, Japanese Buddhist
socialists themselves – not to mention ‘progressive’ Buddhists working from other
national, cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Though we can only superficially deal with
this fact here, let us stay with the example of D.C. Vijayavardhana and Sri Lanka. We see
that despite the flexible frameworks of reinterpretation there were also limits in the construction of convergence between Buddhist teachings and Marxist ideology. Vijayavardhana primarily attacks Marxism’s materialist conception of history and its Soviet version.
He counters this argument, for example, with Buddhist teachings referring to the illusionary and always changing nature of reality and materiality.63 In Burma, U Nu also distanced
himself from some of the more materialist notions of Marxism and declared that despite
the importance of Marxism, the Buddha’s wisdom was to be considered superior to communist ideology.64 And in the case just mentioned above, Seno’o Girō – and indeed,
virtually all Japanese Buddhist socialists – expressed criticism of ‘materialism’ (or at
least, ‘vulgar materialism’) that they saw within secular Marxist and communist movements. According to Seno’o, Buddhism helps to ‘humanize’ secular materialism –
without becoming an ‘opiate’ in the process.
As mentioned above, discussions on the historical accuracy of these understandings are
important, but here we want to emphasize the relevance of these novel readings of Buddhism in the light of its encounter with projects of radical social change. In order to understand the religious underpinnings of some of these radical and revolutionary movements in
Buddhist Asia, we think it is crucial to take these reinterpretations of Buddhist traditions
seriously. To dismiss them as neo-Buddhist fantasies far away from ‘proper’ Buddhism,
or as so much ‘flotsam’ produced in the process of secularization does not help us to understand the transposition of these teachings. Moreover, what one the one hand might look
like distorted and worldly images of Buddhism may, upon a second look, expose deeply
embedded religious features of only seemingly secular political movements; or, in other
words, the political theology of such movements.65 The transformations of some streams
of Buddhism into radical and revolutionary movements can only – as argued above –
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2000). See also Hent de De Vries and Lawrence Sullivan (eds), Political Theologies: Public Religions in a PostSecular World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006).

Downloaded by [James Mark Shields] at 14:57 28 March 2014

16 P. Ladwig and J.M. Shields
be understood when their meaningfulness for Buddhist believers, practitioners and radical
and revolutionary reformers are taken into account.
This brings us to a problem in the attempt to analyze the phenomenon of ‘Buddhist
socialism’, whether in Japan or elsewhere: the very definition of the word ‘socialism’. In
ways akin to the term ‘Buddhism’, socialism can mean different things to different
people in different contexts and situations, especially when trying to move beyond a Eurocentric perspective. Also like Buddhism, the term is frequently employed by advocates,
critics, and scholars alike as though it had an accepted definition upon which all agree.
This is clearly not so. Even in the West, socialism, again, like Buddhism or any major religion, has experienced a century and a half of ‘sectarian’ schism, much of it acrimonious.
Thus we have seen the rise (and fall) of communism, Marxism, anarchism, syndicalism,
Bolshevism, Menshevism, Leninism, Maoism, and various forms of ‘social democracy’ –
to name only the most prominent cases. The situation becomes even more complicated
when these movements and their ideologies (along with their disputes and schisms) cut
across cultural and linguistic divides.
One way to avoid getting bogged down with the issue of determining the precise meaning
of ‘socialist’ is to employ alternative terms – ‘radical’ or ‘revolutionary’ – and understand
Buddhist socialism as one subgenre of this more general category. For the purposes of this
issue we define ‘radical’ as comprising any position that is: (1) politically engaged; and (2)
in opposition to the hegemonic socio-political and/or economic ideology (or ideologies) of
a given period. Thus, a ‘radical Buddhist’ is anyone engaged in the explicit or implicit use of
Buddhist doctrines or principles to foment resistance to the state and/or the socio-political
and/or economic status quo. When we follow the word’s etymology (from Latin radix:
‘root’) as well as the standard Oxford English Dictionary definition of radical as
‘forming an inherent or fundamental part of the nature of someone or something’ and
as ‘advocating or based on thorough or complete political or social reform’, we also see
a connection to revolution, defined as a ‘rapid, fundamental transformation of the state
and social structure’.66
Again, this does not mean that these ‘radical’ Buddhists necessarily hold views that we
would call ‘progressive’; the views and activities of radical Buddhists may fall all over the
political spectrum, though they tend towards the extremes, for obvious reasons. In this
sense, radicalism is ‘a relationship term not a content term. It describes not any particular
set of aspirations and aversions, but a distance between what exists and what is desired, and
the way in which proposed changes are justified’.67 Therefore, one of the benefits of the
terms ‘radical Buddhism’ and ‘revolutionary Buddhism’ is that it is context dependent,
and thus frees us from having to make normative claims about the legitimacy or authenticity of these theories and practices in relation to standards of Marxism, socialism, anarchism, fascism, left, right and so on.

Overview
This special issue came into being through the merging of two panels at the conference of
the International Association of Buddhist Studies held in Jinshan, Taiwan in June 2011: one
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on Buddhist Socialisms (Ladwig) and one on Buddhist Radicalism (Shields). As some participants could not make it to the panels, we decided to merge them, which turned out to
create interesting perspectives on the convergence of variants of socialist, revolutionary
engagement and radical Buddhism. This volume explores six distinct cases of radical and
revolutionary Buddhism, providing a comparative overview of the diverse interactions of
different types of Buddhism and various forms of political radicalism and movements
and thinkers with revolutionary agendas.
As an outcome of that joint panel, this volume focuses on the emergence and development of Buddhist radicalism in the modern period, particularly over the past 130 years.
Contributors focus on Buddhist radicalism as a general phenomenon, but some of them
specifically explore movements that were inspired by socialist ideologies in the broadest
sense and therefore conceptualize these as examples of specific cases of radicalism with
revolutionary aims. By examining the individuals (monks, scholars, and laypeople) and
movements (both inside and outside the sangha) responsible for the creation and promotion of radical Buddhism, this volume deals with an area of Buddhist modernism
that has hitherto been neglected in research. The contributions also examine the various
ways in which the Buddhadharma and radical ideas were conceptualized as an integral
part of the emergence of Asian ‘modernity’, both in response to and in resistance to
Western imperialism and the forces of incipient globalization. By focusing on specific
non-Western conceptions of modernity, the volume allows for a decentering of notions
of a ‘universal’ (or purely Western) modernity.
Finally, as noted above, by understanding Buddhist socialist movements as ‘radical’, this
volume allows for a broader conception of Buddhist resistance, and puts into question the
definition of terms such as ‘socialist’, ‘anarchist’ and ‘communist’ when used in a nonWestern and specifically Asian Buddhist context. Covering examples from Theravāda Buddhism (Thailand, Sri Lanka, Laos) as well as various regions of Mahāyāna Buddhism
(China, Korea and Japan), the volume explores the heterogeneity of these movements,
while also highlighting the continuities that mark the connections and conjunctures
between Buddhism and radical political theories and practice. While mainly historical in
its outlook, the essays approach the relevant topics and materials from a variety of innovative perspectives, exemplifying a broad range of academic viewpoints and methods: historical, philosophical, anthropological, textual and cultural. Many questions are raised, and
many left unanswered; but that is the nature of what we believe is a new and exciting subfield within Buddhist Studies. We thank the editors of Politics, Religion and Ideology for
working with us to make this special issue possible.
Notes on Contributors
Patrice Ladwig studied Social Anthropology and Sociology in Germany, France and the UK
and obtained his PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Cambridge in 2008.
He has held postdoctoral positions at the University of Bristol, UK and the Max Planck
Institute for Social Anthropology (Halle, Germany) and is currently visiting professor at
the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Zürich. His research interests
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